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Abstract
In this paper we study data from the yearly reports the four major Swedish
non-life insurers have sent to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority
(FSA). We aim at finding marginal distributions of, and dependence be-
tween, losses on the five largest lines of business (LoBs) in order to create
models for Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) calculation. We try to
use data in an optimal way by sensibly defining an accounting year loss in
terms of actuarial liability predictions, and by pooling observations from
several companies when possible to decrease the uncertainty about the
underlying distributions and their parameters. We find that dependence
between LoBs is weaker in our data than what is assumed in the Solvency
II standard formula. We also find dependence between companies that
may affect financial stability, and must be taken into account when es-
timating loss distribution parameters. Moreover, we discuss under what
circumstances an insurer is better (or worse) off using an internal model
for SCR calculation instead of the standard formula.
1 Introduction
In recent years much research has been focused on new ways to model depen-
dence of insurance risks (for example [4], [8], [10] and [11]). Some interesting
work has also been done on what to do in the case when data for dependence
estimation is scarce (see [1] and [7]). Less research has been aimed at what
marginal distributions to use when modeling insurance losses; in the Solvency
II standard formula for Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) calculation one
simply assumes the lognormal distribution and then calibrates the parameters
to get an overall SCR that corresponds to the 99.5% Value-at-Risk (VaR) of
the insurer’s basic own funds over a one-year period, ie, the 0.995 quantile of
the insurer’s one-year loss distribution (see [6] for details). In this context, the
one-year loss of an insurer is the change in the insurer’s net liability value over
a one-year horizon. If we only consider risks on the liability side of the balance
sheet the one-year loss is the change in prediction of liabilities from one year to
the next.
As most practitioners know, the limiting factor when trying to come up
with reasonable capital requirements for an insurance company is the lack of
useful data. The author’s experience is that the best one can hope for is about
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20 observations of yearly losses for each line of business (LoB) of an insurance
company, and that these observations often must be adjusted in order to be
viewed as identically distributed. If one could pool data from several companies
the number of observations would increase dramatically, but since the companies
to a large extent are exposed to the same risks dependence must be examined
carefully before pooling data. Moreover, testing whether or not the samples from
the different companies can be considered drawn from the same distribution is
crucial. For example, if we pool data from samples with different variances, the
pooled sample may show signs of heavy-tailedness that is not present in the
individual samples.
In this paper we study data from the yearly reports the four major Swedish
non-life insurers (Folksam, If, La¨nsfo¨rsa¨kringar (LF) and Trygg-Hansa) have
sent to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) (Finansinspektio-
nen in Swedish). We aim at finding marginal distributions of, and dependence
between, the five LoBs Illness and Accident, Home, Business Liability and Prop-
erty, Motor Liability and Motor Other to create models for SCR calculation
solely based on the FSA data. We investigate if the dependence structure we
see in data agrees with the dependence structure in the Solvency II standard for-
mula. Moreover, we try to find signs of dependence between the companies. Too
much dependence between companies is bad for financial stability. Also, if the
dependence between companies is not too strong we may pool data from several
companies to get less uncertainty in the loss distribution parameter estimation.
This is the outline of the paper: In Section 2 we introduce the notation, set
up liability cash flow predictions and define an accounting year loss in terms
of changes in these predictions. We explain how data from the FSA reports
are transformed into losses in Section 3. In Section 4 we analyze tail-heaviness
of the insurance loss data, and investigate the dependence between LoBs and
companies. We give suggestions of how to model marginal distributions and
dependence to calculate SCR in Section 5, and in Section 6 we compare our
models to the standard formula in Solvency II. Section 7 contains a concluding
discussion.
2 Notation
In this section we introduce the notation that will be used throughout the paper.
In particular, we define an accounting year loss in terms of changes in liability
predictions.
Consider a fixed company and a fixed LoB, and denote the cumulative claim
payments for accident year i and development year j by Ci,j . This is the total
amount paid by the end of accounting year i+j for claims arising from accidents
incurred during year i. The actuarial ultimo prediction at time n (ie, the end of
accounting year n) of cumulative claim payments for accident year i is denoted
by Cˆ
(n)
i,ultimo, and the earned premium for accident year i is denoted by Vi.
Now, consider accounting year n + 1. In the beginning of the accounting
year, the (undiscounted) value of the cash flow arising from already incurred
claims is a summation of predicted payments over the last k− 1 accident years,
R0 :=
n∑
i=n−k+2
(
Cˆ
(n)
i,ultimo − Ci,n−i
)
. (1)
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(We use the letter R since the change in valuation of this cash flow is related
to the reserve risk.) To value the cash flow arising from not yet incurred claims
we define the loss ratio
ℓˆ
(n)
n+1 :=
n∑
i=n−m+1
Cˆ
(n)
i,ultimo
/
n∑
i=n−m+1
Vi, (2)
where m is the number of years used for estimation. Given a choice of m, the
value of the cash flow arising from claims incurring in year n+1 (not yet incurred
claims) is
P0 := Vn+1ℓˆ
(n)
n+1. (3)
(We use the letter P since the change in valuation of this cash flow is related
to the premium risk.) Note that we assume Vn+1 known in the beginning of
accounting year n+1 even though, in reality, it is not completely known before
the year ends. This is not a very strong assumption since the prediction error
of the earned premium in general is very small compared to the errors in the
payment predictions. Moreover, if the earned premium is lower (higher) than
what we predicted in the beginning of the accounting year then the loss will
also be lower (higher), so the error does not matter substantially.
The prediction of the total outstanding liability cash flow is now
Y0 := R0 + P0. (4)
In the end of the accounting year, we have new information and hence new
valuations of the above cash flows. These valuations are
R1 :=
n∑
i=n−k+2
(
Cˆ
(n+1)
i,ultimo − Ci,n−i
)
, (5)
P1 := Cˆ
(n+1)
n+1,ultimo, (6)
Y1 := R1 + P1. (7)
We define a loss as a positive change in the valuation of outstanding liabilities.
The normalized loss for accounting year n+ 1 is given by
U :=
Y1 − Y0
Y0
. (8)
3 Data
In this section we explain which data in the FSA reports we use and how we
transform these data into losses on the different LoBs of each company.
The data comes from the yearly reports Folksam, If, LF and Trygg-Hansa
have sent to the FSA. The five LoBs we consider are: Illness and Accident (IA),
Home (H), Business Liability and Property (BLP), Motor Liability (ML) and
Motor Other (MO). The reports contain, for each LoB, today’s cumulative claim
payments and ultimo predictions of the cumulative claim payments (in nominal
values) for the last k accident years. For the LoBs Home and Motor Other
k = 3, for Illness and Accident and Business Liability and Property k = 10, and
for Motor Liability k = 15. The reports also contain values of the (nominal)
earned premiums for the three latest accident years.
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Earned premium Cumulative payments and ultimo predictions
Cn−k+1,k−1 Cˆ
(n)
n−k+1,ultimo
Vn−2 .
. . ...
Vn−1 Cn−1,1 Cˆ
(n)
n−1,ultimo
Vn Cn,0 Cˆ
(n)
n,ultimo
Vn+1
Table 1: Data considered known at time n (ie, the end of accounting year n or
beginning of accounting year n+ 1).
The FSA data assumed known at time n are shown in Table 1. As mentioned
in the previous section, we consider Vn+1 known already at time n even though
it is not completely known until time n + 1. For each accounting year, we use
the data known in the beginning of the year and make a prediction (Y0) of the
outstanding liability cash flow using (1)–(4), with m = 3 in (2). Then, we move
forward in time until the end of the year when the next report is available and
make a new prediction (Y1) of the same cash flow using (5)–(7). The normalized
one-year loss (U) is now given by (8).
The ultimo predictions in (1), (5) and (6) were made by actuaries at the
different companies, but the methods used are not stated in the reports. The
only intervention by the author to the normalized loss construction above is
the choice m = 3 in (2). We make this choice since we only have three years
of premium data in the first available FSA report. We could use a longer
period for later accounting years, and this may give better predictions if the
loss ratio is stationary. However, it is reasonable to believe that changes in
pricing procedures make the loss ratio non-stationary. If we use m = 1 or
m = 2 we get normalized losses very similar to the case m = 3.
We construct normalized losses (U) for the accounting years 1999 to 2011 for
all five LoBs in the four companies. The reports considered in this paper were
introduced in 1998, so we cannot go further back in time. As seen in Figure 1,
the data quality of the first one to three accounting years is questionable. This
may be due to misreporting, Folksam’s first two normalized losses in the LoB
Illness and Accident are for example not even visible in the plot. Folksam also
has one large normalized loss in the LoB Business Liability and Property which
is not visible in the plot. However, since Folksam sold most of this LoB to
Trygg-Hansa in 2001, the absolute loss is small for a company of Folksam’s size.
For the LoBs Illness and Accident and Motor Liability we consistently have
Ri >> Pi (i = 0, 1), so revaluation and payments of claims incurred before the
considered accounting year is the main component of the loss for these LoBs.
For the LoBs Home and Motor Other we consistently have Pi >> Ri, so re-
valuation and payment of claims incurred during the considered accounting year
is the main component of the loss for these LoBs. For the LoB Business Liability
and Property Ri and Pi are similar in size.
4 Data analysis
In this section we study marginal distributions of the different LoBs, dependen-
cies between companies for a specified LoB, and dependencies between LoBs
within companies.
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Figure 1: Time series plots of the normalized losses (U) for the accounting years
1999 to 2011. Three of Folksam’s losses are not visible in the plots, two in IA
and one in BLP.
In Figure 1 we see that the normalized losses are centered around zero for
all LoBs and companies so there is no obvious bias in the liability predictions.
For the LoB Motor Liability, the variance seems to be higher for Trygg-Hansa
than for the other three companies. The author is not aware of any insurance
events that have affected Trygg-Hansa more than the other companies that could
explain this fact. Moreover, there seem to be positive trends in the losses for
the LoBs Home and Motor Other, at least from 2004. The explanation may be
that the winters 2009/10, 2010/11 and 2011/12 were colder than the winters in
the first years of the 21st century. Another hypothesis is that competition has
become fiercer leading to lower premiums so that a predictor based on historical
loss ratios underestimates future losses.
In the analysis that follows we exclude the losses for the first two accounting
years for all LoBs and companies due to questionable data quality. The QQ
plots in Figure 2 indicate that the normal distribution is a reasonable choice
for the marginal distributions of losses on the LoBs Home, Motor Liability and
Motor Other. Folksam has two outliers, one in the left tail of Motor Liability
and one in the left tail of Motor Other. These outliers are both from accounting
year 2001 which is the third year in the period, and it is unclear whether these
outliers exist due to misreporting or some insurance events. In the LoBs Illness
and Accident and Business Liability and Property there are signs of heavy tails
in the data.
As mentioned in the previous section, Folksam’s Business Liability and Prop-
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Figure 2: Normal QQ plots based on normalized losses (U) for the accounting
years 2001 to 2011 assuming zero mean for each LoB in each company.
Folksam If LF Trygg-Hansa
IA 0.040 0.15 0.090 0.21
H 0.082 0.10 0.092 0.12
BLP 1.5 0.10 0.18 0.22
ML 0.077 0.026 0.028 0.12
MO 0.17 0.069 0.12 0.11
Table 2: Sample standard deviations of the normalized losses for the accounting
years 2001 to 2011 assuming zero mean for each LoB in each company.
erty LoB is small both compared to Folksam’s other LoBs and to the other
three companies’ BLP LoBs. There is also one extreme outlier (with value 4.94)
among Folksam’s normalized BLP losses leading to a much larger sample stan-
dard deviation for Folksam than for the other three companies (see Table 2).
Due to Folksam’s different size and data it does not make sense to include Folk-
sam when pooling BLP data trying to improve distributional assumptions and
parameter estimates. We also leave Folksam’s BLP data out when studying
dependence between companies and LoBs.
To check whether or not pooling of data makes sense, we conduct Levene’s
tests for equality of variances (see [9] and [2] for details) for each LoB. The test
statistic W is based on absolute deviations from the medians. Let uij be the
jth observed normalized loss and mi be the median of the observed normalized
losses for company i. If zij = |uij −mi|, then
W =
g(n− 1)
g − 1
n
∑g
i=1(z¯i· − z¯··)
2∑g
i=1
∑n
j=1(zij − z¯i·)
2
,
where g is the number of companies, n is the number of observations for each
company, z¯i· =
∑n
j=1 zij/n is the company mean and z¯·· =
∑g
i=1 z¯i·/g is the
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Line of Business Test statistic (Wˆ ) p-value
Illness and Accident 1.93 0.14
Home 0.36 0.78
Business Liability and Property (without Folksam) 1.14 0.33
Motor Liability 4.71 0.0066
Motor Liability (without Trygg-Hansa) 0.64 0.54
Motor Other 0.82 0.49
Table 3: Observed values of Levene’s test statistic W and the corresponding
p-values.
IA H BLP ML MO
(Folksam, If) 0.21 0.58 - 0.30 0.63
(Folksam, LF) −0.09 0.93 - 0.17 0.78
(Folksam, Trygg-Hansa) −0.40 0.87 - −0.42 0.79
(If, LF) 0.18 0.67 0.51 0.14 0.79
(If, Trygg-Hansa) −0.25 0.51 −0.23 −0.06 0.67
(LF, Trygg-Hansa) 0.32 0.79 −0.31 −0.04 0.76
Table 4: Rank correlations between companies for each LoB in terms of Spear-
man’s ρ.
overall mean. Under the assumption of equal variances across all samples, W is
F -distributed with g − 1 and g(n− 1) degrees of freedom.
Since Trygg-Hansa have a higher Motor Liability sample variance than the
other companies, we conduct Levene’s tests both with and without Trygg-Hansa
in the sample set for this LoB. The test statistics shown in Table 3 clearly indi-
cate that the Motor Liability variance for Trygg-Hansa differs from the variances
of the other companies. For the other LoBs it seems reasonable to conclude that
the samples for the different companies have similar variances. Note that Folk-
sam is not included in the BLP sample set.
Rank correlations, in terms of Spearman’s ρ, between losses of different
companies for each LoB are shown in Table 4, and rank correlations between
losses of different LoBs within the companies are shown in Table 5. We choose
Spearman’s ρ as a measure of association since it is both robust against non-
normality and close to the linear correlation coefficient in the bivariate normal
case,
ρSpearman’s =
6
π
arcsin
ρlinear
2
.
For two independent samples with 11 observations each, the probability of get-
ting a Spearman’s ρ with absolute value larger than 0.62 is 5%. Thus, it is
unlikely that the losses of different companies are independent for the LoBs
Home and Motor Other, see Table 4. For the other LoBs it seems reasonable
to assume independence between companies. Based on the scattered rank cor-
relations between LoBs within the companies in Table 5, it seems reasonable to
assume independence between LoBs except between Home and Motor Other.
This is the only pair that has correlations of the same sign for all companies.
The QQ plots in Figure 2 indicate that the LoBs Home and Motor Other
have normally distributed losses with mean close to zero. Let U cH and U
c
MO be
the loss for company c in LoB Home and Motor Other, respectively. We use the
short forms: F for Folksam, I for If, LF for La¨nsfo¨rsa¨kringar and TH for Trygg-
Hansa, and assume that the vector (UFH , U
I
H, U
LF
H , U
TH
H , U
F
MO, U
I
MO, U
LF
MO, U
TH
MO)
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Folksam If LF Trygg-Hansa
(IA, H) −0.22 0.26 −0.54 −0.13
(IA, BLP) - −0.22 −0.27 0.30
(IA, ML) −0.36 −0.25 −0.50 0.76
(IA, MO) 0.05 −0.52 −0.26 −0.65
(H, BLP) - 0.29 0.16 0.34
(H, ML) 0.60 −0.34 0.53 −0.17
(H, MO) 0.58 0.27 0.65 0.52
(BLP, ML) - −0.01 −0.48 0.49
(BLP, MO) - 0.55 0.46 −0.13
(ML, MO) 0.86 −0.24 0.06 −0.56
Table 5: Rank correlations between LoBs within companies in terms of Spear-
man’s ρ.
is drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and covariance
matrix
Σ =
(
ΣH ΣH,MO
ΣH,MO ΣMO
)
,
where
ΣH = σ
2
H


1 ρH ρH ρH
ρH 1 ρH ρH
ρH ρH 1 ρH
ρH ρH ρH 1

 ,
ΣMO = σ
2
MO


1 ρMO ρMO ρMO
ρMO 1 ρMO ρMO
ρMO ρMO 1 ρMO
ρMO ρMO ρMO 1

 ,
and
ΣH,MO = σHσMO


ρ1 ρ2 ρ2 ρ2
ρ2 ρ1 ρ2 ρ2
ρ2 ρ2 ρ1 ρ2
ρ2 ρ2 ρ2 ρ1

 .
The assumptions leading to the matrices above are:
• for each LoB, the variance is the same for all companies, ie, Var(U cH) = σ
2
H
and Var(U cMO) = σ
2
MO for all c,
• for each LoB, the correlation between each pair of companies is the same,
ie, Corr(U c1H , U
c2
H ) = ρH and Corr(U
c1
MO, U
c2
MO) = ρMO for c1 6= c2,
• the correlation between Home and Motor Other is the same within all
companies, ie, Corr(U cH, U
c
MO) = ρ1 for all c,
• the correlation between Home in one company and Motor Other in another
company is the same for each pair of companies, ie, Corr(U c1H , U
c2
MO) = ρ2
for c1 6= c2.
Because of Folksam’s outlier in the LoB Motor Other, we estimate the parame-
ters both with and without the vector observed for accounting year 2001 in the
sample. A likelihood ratio test strongly suggests that ρ1 = ρ2 in both cases,
and the maximum likelihood parameter estimates are shown in Table 6.
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Case σˆH σˆMO ρˆH ρˆMO ρˆ1
Accounting year 2001 included 0.099 0.12 0.74 0.57 0.35
Accounting year 2001 not included 0.10 0.096 0.75 0.52 0.64
Table 6: Maximum likelihood parameter estimates for Home and Motor Other.
Line of Business Shape (ξˆ) Scale (βˆ)
Illness and Accident 0 0.088
Business Liability and Property (without Folksam) 0 0.16
Table 7: Maximum likelihood estimates of the generalized Pareto parameters.
Denote the model for Home and Motor Other by M1, and let M0 be the
reduction of M1 with ρ1 = 0. The test statistic D = 2(ℓ(M1) − ℓ(M0)),
where ℓ(Mi) is the maximum log-likelihood for model Mi, is approximately
χ21-distributed under the null hypothesis ρ1 = 0 (see, eg, pp. 35–36 in [3]). If
accounting year 2001 is included in the sample we observe Dˆ = 2.73, and since
P (D > 2.73) = 0.099 under the null hypothesis, the choice between M0 and
M1 is not obvious. In the SCR calculations in the following section we use M1
and the estimate ρˆ1 = 0.35. This choice will yield higher capital requirements
than M0, but due to the limited amount of data we choose to be conservative.
If accounting year 2001 is not included in the sample we observe Dˆ = 16.1, so
in this case the likelihood ratio test clearly suggests that ρ1 6= 0.
For Illness and Accident we pool data from all companies, for Business Lia-
bility and Property we pool data from If, LF and Trygg-Hansa, and for Motor
Liability we pool data from Folksam, If and LF. These decisions are based on
the results of the Levene’s tests conducted earlier in this section. The Motor Li-
ability data is close to normally distributed. We assume zero mean and estimate
the standard deviation σML of the pooled data both with and without Folksam’s
observation from accounting year 2001. We get σˆML = 0.050 if Folksam’s 2001
observation is included, and σˆML = 0.025 if it is not included.
The yearly loss distributions for Illness and Accident and Business Liability
and Property show signs of heavy-tailedness. For these LoBs we fit generalized
Pareto (GP) distributions to the pooled positive losses using maximum likeli-
hood. We get the shape and scale parameter estimates shown in Table 7, and
the corresponding QQ plots are shown in Figure 3. It is worth emphasizing
that it is not possible to justify the choice of the GP distribution by arguing
that it is a limiting distribution. We choose the GP distribution since it has few
parameters but is still flexible enough to capture different tail behaviors.
5 Modeling and SCR calculation
In this section we set up simple internal models for each company. Moreover,
we give a suggestion of how the marginal loss distribution of each LoB and the
dependence between LoBs can be modeled using data from all four companies.
We calculate SCR values for the four companies given these models.
For a given company, we denote today’s liability predictions of incurred
and not yet incurred claims for LoB ℓ by Rℓ0 and P
ℓ
0 , respectively, and let
Y ℓ0 = R
ℓ
0 + P
ℓ
0 . Suppose that we want to create a model for SCR calculation,
but only have access to FSA data for our given company. Due to the limited
9
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Figure 3: Normal and generalized Pareto QQ plots for the pooled data of the
LoBs Illness and Accident and Business Liability and Property.
amount of data we set up a very simple internal model where we assume that
all LoBs are independent, and that the margins are normally distributed with
zero mean. The 0.995 quantile of the total loss distribution, ie, the SCR for
reserve and premium risk in Solvency II, in our internal model is given by
SCRinternal = z0.995
√ ∑
ℓ∈{IA,H,BLP,ML,MO}
(Y ℓ0 sℓ)
2,
where z0.995 ≈ 2.58 denotes the 0.995 quantile of the standard normal distribu-
tion and sℓ is the standard deviation of the normalized losses of LoB ℓ. The
SCR values calculated for this internal model using the liability predictions from
the accounting year 2011 (see Table 9) and the sample standard deviations (see
Table 2) as parameters are shown in Table 11. Note that V and R0 are given
by the actuaries in the reports, while P0 depends on the author’s loss ratio
definition (see (2) and (3)).
Now, we use the FSA data for all companies. Based on our findings in the
previous sections, we assume that the total loss X of our company is the sum
of four independent losses
X = XIA +XBLP +XML +XH,MO,
whereXIA, XBLP andXML are losses on the LoBs Illness and Accident, Business
Liability and Property, and Motor Liability, respectively, and XH,MO is the
combined loss of the LoBs Home and Motor Other. Moreover, we assume that
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Model σH σMO ρ1 σ
F,I,LF
ML σ
TH
ML ξIA βIA ξBLP βBLP
1 0.099 0.12 0.35 0.050 0.12 0 0.088 0 0.16
2 0.10 0.096 0.64 0.025 0.12 0 0.088 0 0.16
Table 8: Parameter assumptions in the models based on pooled FSA data.
Folksam If La¨nsfo¨rsa¨kringar Trygg-Hansa
LoB V R0 P0 V R0 P0 V R0 P0 V R0 P0
IA 1.49 5.05 1.11 0.64 1.07 0.42 1.30 3.18 1.08 2.53 6.00 1.51
H 2.67 1.12 1.76 1.63 0.59 1.10 3.51 1.61 2.51 1.49 0.65 1.08
BLP 0.26 0.14 0.18 1.85 2.27 1.02 5.13 3.71 3.22 1.67 1.26 1.05
ML 0.98 4.32 0.74 1.94 11.07 1.67 2.87 11.29 2.16 1.70 6.29 0.99
MO 1.96 0.18 1.13 3.50 0.34 2.19 3.62 0.60 2.45 2.11 0.39 1.44
Table 9: Earned premiums and initial predictions for accounting year 2011. All
values in billion SEK.
• XH,MO is normally distributed with mean zero and variance (Y
H
0 σH)
2 +
(Y MO0 σMO)
2 + 2Y H0 Y
MO
0 σHσMOρ1,
• XML is normally distributed with mean zero and variance (Y
ML
0 σML)
2,
• for ℓ ∈ {IA,BLP}, Xℓ = BℓZℓ, where Bℓ and Zℓ are independent, Zℓ is
generalized Pareto distributed with shape parameter ξℓ and scale param-
eter Y ℓ0 βℓ, and P (Bℓ = 1) = P (Bℓ = −1) = 0.5.
We use the liability predictions from the accounting year 2011 (see Table 9)
together with the parameter assumptions shown in Table 8 to calculate the 0.995
quantile of the distribution of the total loss X . The parameters in Model 1 and
Model 2 are the estimates from the previous section when Folksam’s outliers in
Motor Liability and Motor Other are included and not included, respectively, in
the sample. Notice that we use a different Motor Liability standard devation for
Trygg-Hansa than for the other three companies. Levene’s test showed us that
Trygg-Hansa’s variance was significantly different from the other companies’
variance, so we use the sample standard deviation from Table 2 for Trygg-Hansa
instead of the standard deviation of the pooled data sample. Also notice that we
assume the same Business Liabiliy and Property parameters for all companies
even though Folksam’s data was considered different from the other companies’
data and therefore not included in the pooled sample. However, since Folksam’s
BLP LoB is small compared to its other LoBs, this assumption does not affect
the overall SCR of Folksam substantially.
For the LoBs Illness and Accident and Business Liability and Property, we
assume distributions symmetric around zero where the absolute value is GP
distributed with shape parameter ξ = 0, ie, exponentially distributed. Thus,
for ℓ ∈ {IA,BLP}, E[Xℓ] = 0,
Var(Xℓ) = E[X
2
ℓ ] = E[Z
2
ℓ ] = Var(Zℓ) + E[Zℓ]
2 = 2β2ℓ
and
F−1Xℓ (0.995) = F
−1
Zℓ
(0.99) = − log(0.01)βℓ ≈ 3.26
√
Var(Xℓ),
where F−1· denotes the inverse distribution function, ie, the quantile function.
So, the ratio between the 0.995 quantile and the standard deviation is larger
than for the normal distribution in these LoBs.
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LoB (in Solvency II) V LoBprem V
LoB
res σ
LoB
prem σ
LoB
res
Medical Expense 0.25V IA 0.25RIA0 0.050 0.050
Income Protection 0.75V IA 0.75RIA0 0.085 0.14
Motor Vehicle Liability V ML RML0 0.10 0.090
Other Motor V MO RMO0 0.080 0.080
Fire and Property Damage 0.9V H + 0.8V BLP 0.9RH0 + 0.8R
BLP
0 0.080 0.10
Third-Party Liability 0.1V H + 0.2V BLP 0.1RH0 + 0.2R
BLP
0 0.14 0.11
Table 10: Solvency II LoB segmentation and standard formula parameters.
6 The standard formula in Solvency II
In this section we calculate SCR for the four companies using the standard
formula in Solvency II (see [5] for details). We compare these values to the SCR
values calculated using our models.
To calculate SCR for premium and reserve risk using the Solvency II stan-
dard formula, we must use the LoB segmentation defined in the directive. Illness
and Accident includes two Solvency II LoBs; Medical Expense (ME) and Income
Protection (IP) in the Health module. We assume that 25% of the premiums
(and reserves) correspond to Medical Expense and 75% to Income Protection.
Motor Liability and Motor Other correspond directly to the Solvency II LoBs
Motor Vehicle Liability (MVL) and Other Motor (OM), respectively. Both these
LoBs are in the Non-life module. We assume that 90% of Home correspond to
the Solvency II LoB Fire and Property Damage (FPD), and 10% correspond
to Third-Party Liability (TPL). For Business Liability and Property we assume
that the proportions are 80% and 20%, respectively. Both Fire and Property
Damage and Third-Party Liability are in the Non-life module. With these as-
sumptions we get the Solvency II volume measures for premium and reserve
risk, V LoBprem and V
LoB
res , respectively, shown in Table 10. In this table we also see
the standard deviations specified by the regulators.
Using the values in Table 10 we calculate, for each LoB, the LoB volume
measure
VLoB = V
LoB
prem + V
LoB
res (9)
and the LoB standard deviation
σLoB =
√
(σLoBpremV
LoB
prem)
2 + 2ασLoBpremσ
LoB
res V
LoB
premV
LoB
res + (σ
LoB
res V
LoB
res )
2
VLoB
, (10)
where the correlation coefficient α = 0.5 by assumption in the standard formula.
The LoBs Medical Expense and Income Protection belong to the sub-module
NonSLT Health in the module Health. The volume measure for this sub-module
is given by
VNonSLT Health = VME + VIP,
and the standard deviation is given by
σNonSLT Health =
√
(σMEVME)2 + 2ρME,IPσMEσIPVMEVIP + (σIPVIP)2
VNonSLT Health
,
12
where the correlation coefficient ρME,IP = 0.5 by assumption. Since we only
consider premium and reserve risk, the SCR for the Health module is given by
SCRHealth = 3σNonSLT HealthVNonSLT Health. (11)
The Solvency II assumption behind (11) is that the underlying risk follows a
lognormal distribution. For the range of standard deviations considered in the
Solvency II standard formula, the 0.995 quantile is approximately 3σ.
Now, define the set SNon-life := {MVL,OM,FPD,TPL} containing the LoBs
in the Non-life module. The volume measure for the premium and reserve risk
of the Non-life module is given by
VNon-life =
∑
j∈SNon-life
Vj ,
and the standard deviation is given by
σNon-life =
1
VNon-life
√ ∑
i∈SNon-life
∑
j∈SNon-life
ρi,jσiσjViVj ,
where the correlations are assumed to be ρMVL,OM = 0.5, ρMVL,FPD = 0.25,
ρMVL,TPL = 0.5, ρOM,FPD = 0.25, ρOM,TPL = 0.25 and ρFPD,TPL = 0.25.
Since we only consider premium and reserve risk, the SCR for the Non-life
module is given by
SCRNon-life = 3σNon-lifeVNon-life.
In the standard formula, the Health and Non-life modules are assumed to be
independent. Hence, we get the overall SCR by
SCR =
√
SCR2Health+SCR
2
Non-life.
Again, note that we are only considering premium and reserve risk in this pa-
per. The SCR values are calculated using the Solvency II standard formula are
shown in Table 11 together with the SCR values calculated using our model
assumptions from the previous section.
Now, for each Swedish LoB ℓ, let V ℓ be the sum of earned premiums over all
companies and let Rℓ0 be the sum of initial predictions of incurred claims over all
companies for accounting year 2011 (see Table 9). Using these values together
with the proportions and standard deviations in Table 10, and equations (9)
and (10), we get a benchmark value of the standard devation (σLoB) for each
Solvency II LoB.
The Swedish LoBs Motor Liability and Motor Other correspond directly to
the Solvency II LoBs Motor Vehicle Liability and Other Motor, respectively. To
get an idea about the standard formula assumptions regarding standard devia-
tions for the Swedish LoBs Illness and Accident, Home and Business Liability
and Property, we calculate
σStandard formulaℓ =
√
(σiℓπℓ)
2 + 2ρiℓ,jℓσiℓσjℓπℓ(1− πℓ) + (σjℓ(1 − πℓ))
2,
for ℓ ∈ {IA,H,BLP}, where πℓ and (1− πℓ) are the proportions of the Swedish
LoB ℓ allocated to the Solvency II LoBs iℓ and jℓ, respectively, and ρiℓ,jℓ is the
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Folksam If LF Trygg-Hansa
Predicted liabilities (
∑
ℓ Y
ℓ
0 ) 15.73 21.74 31.81 20.66
SCR(Internal model) 1.92 1.47 3.77 4.87
SCR(Model 1) 2.69 2.99 5.63 3.93
SCR(Model 2) 2.65 2.69 5.48 3.92
SCR(Standard formula) 2.84 4.54 6.02 3.73
SCR(Internal model)/Predicted liabilities 0.12 0.068 0.12 0.23
SCR(Model 1)/Predicted liabilities 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.19
SCR(Model 2)/Predicted liabilities 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.19
SCR(Standard formula)/Predicted liabilities 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.18
Table 11: SCR values calculated using our model assumptions and the Solvency
II standard formula, respectively.
correlation between the Solvency II LoBs iℓ and jℓ assumed in the standard
formula. These standard deviations, and the corresponding 0.995 quantiles
achieved by multiplying the standard deviation by 3, are shown in Table 12
together with the standard deviations and 0.995 quantiles of our models from
the previous section.
Model 1 Model 2 Standard formula
σ q0.995/σ q0.995 σ q0.995/σ q0.995 σ q0.995/σ q0.995
IA 0.12 3.26 0.41 0.12 3.26 0.41 0.092 3 0.28
H 0.099 2.58 0.26 0.10 2.58 0.26 0.072 3 0.22
BLP 0.23 3.26 0.74 0.23 3.26 0.74 0.070 3 0.21
MLF,I,LF 0.050 2.58 0.13 0.025 2.58 0.064 0.084 3 0.25
MLTH 0.12 2.58 0.31 0.12 2.58 0.31 0.084 3 0.25
MO 0.12 2.58 0.31 0.096 2.58 0.25 0.076 3 0.23
Table 12: Assumptions about standard deviations (σ) and 0.995 quantiles
(q0.995) in our models and the Solvency II standard formula, respectively.
7 Discussion
One major finding in the analysis is that dependence between LoBs seems to
be weaker than what is assumed in the Solvency II standard formula. The only
signs of dependence we see in the FSA data is between the LoBs Home and
Motor Other, and between companies within these LoBs. These two light-tailed
LoBs typically have many small claims with short time between accident and
final payment. More research is needed in order to find out what causes the
dependence between companies within these LoBs, but one hypothesis is that
competition has caused premiums to converge, and since the companies to a
large extent are exposed to the same risks in these LoBs the relative losses
also converge. Losses on the LoBs Illness and Accident and Motor Liability
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are mainly due to revaluation of old claims. To get dependence between these
LoBs, or between companies within any of these LoBs, there should be some
external factor (for example a legal change) that causes all revaluations to go
in the same direction. However, we do not see any such sign in the FSA data.
The SCR values calculated using Model 1 and Model 2 of this paper are
in the neighborhood of the values calculated using the Solvency II standard
formula for Folksam, LF and Trygg-Hansa (see Table 11). For If, however, the
SCR is substantially lower in our models than in the standard formula. Due to
its large motor portfolio, the total loss of If is extremely dependent on the Motor
Liability distribution which is light-tailed with low variance in our models.
The standard formula assumes positive dependencies between LoBs that
are hard to motivate from what we see in the FSA data. However, the SCR
values calculated using the standard formula are not too far away from the
values calculated using our models, so the marginal distributions in the standard
formula must have either lower variance or lighter tails than what we assume
in our models. In Table 12 we see that the standard formula assumes lower
variance in all LoBs except Motor Liability, lighter tails in Illness and Accident
and Business Liability and Property, but heavier tails in Home, Motor Liability
and Motor Other. Since dependence structures are very difficult to estimate
from a small data sample, my suggestion is to assume independence when no
clear dependence is seen in data, and use conservative estimates for the marginal
distributions to (at least to some extent) offset the dependence uncertainty.
More research, and data, is needed in order to determine the marginal one-year
loss distributions as well as dependence structures with less uncertainty.
An interesting implication of using data from several companies to create
a standard model for SCR calculation (for example the Solvency II standard
formula) is that high prediction uncertainty in one LoB for one company may
imply higher SCR values for all companies. To get rid of the implicit dependence
of actuaries and/or executives in other companies that follows from using the
standard model, companies should be encouraged to develop their own internal
models for SCR calculation. A company that has good models for liability
predictions should be able to motivate the use of an internal model that yields
a lower SCR value than the standard model. However, a company that adjusts
liability predictions to smooth gains and losses over time (and thereby increases
the liability prediction variance) may be better off using the standard model.
All liability predictions in this paper are done without discounting. Extend-
ing the FSA reports to include full run-off triangles would make discounting
possible. Moreover, with full triangles it would be possible to investigate the
dependencies between the liability and the asset side of an insurer’s balance
sheet. The dependence between insurance losses and the interest rates used for
discounting would be of particular interest to investigate in a future analysis.
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